Adorno's Constellations (2)

Concept, singularity and dialectics

In the last post, I introduced one of the basic problems of metaphysics, the universal-particular problem. My intent was to acquaint you with the subsequent question of the non-conceptual in conceptual thinking. In other words, how to grasp the singularity of an object with the sole use of concepts – expressions of a general content.

I told you about Hegel's attempt to solve the issue: building a range, a network of concepts through "continuous specification", which could maybe be described more accurately as a series of concepts. The problem with a series is that it never reach its limit. And this limit is what we are looking for, namely the singularity of the object. Hegel needed a way out of the infinity implied by the series, a way to the uniqueness of the object. This way out is explained in his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: if an object has a general, universal character what makes him stand out as unique is the way it realizes this universal character. I could say in a more philosophical jargon: the haecceity of a thing is constituted by the way it instantiates the concept. Let's take an example: A madman's singularity is not "being mad". A lot of individuals are, were, can be, will be mad and our madman doesn't stand out of this crowd. But how he is mad – was way he realizes, instantiates madness – makes him particular.

Black hole.png
Black holes too have singularities! (Image credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech)

Adorno, in several places (at least in Negative Dialektik and _Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2^[1]), points to incoherencies in Hegel's idea: Hegel is forced to define singularity, then he conceptualizes singularity which makes no sense at all since it puts singularity in the category of concepts. In other words, singularity turns into a universal^[2].

So what's next? Can we remove conceptualization from the equation? We could. But that's not a wise thing to do as immediate knowledge from our senses isn't an option: Hegel showed that this causes more issues than solves our problem, as we immediately come back to conceptualization. If I am able to perceive this particular thing here and now, I need at least four concepts: I, this (thing), here and now. So we're back to square one. We can't do without concepts.

However, there is a way. Alison Stone writes:

Adorno agrees with Hegel that objects cannot be known “immediately” (i.e. through the senses alone); we cannot apprehend objects without “mediating” them through concepts [Negative Dialectic, 1973, p. 186]. This seems to leave Adorno in a dilemma. He wants us to recognize that things have a non-identical element without conceptualizing that element in universal terms, yet he denies that we can know anything without conceptualizing it. To solve this dilemma, Adorno sees the concept of the non-identical as a limit-concept. This concept does not give us any positive knowledge about things. It simply indicates the place where conceptual understanding encounters limits, or a side of things that concepts do not cover. But the concept of the non-identical also indicates that we cannot know anything about this side of things just because our concepts cannot cover it. Thus, it is possible, using concepts, to recognize that conceptual understanding is limited, and specifically that concepts are not adequate to the non-identical element in things.^[3]

We can now clearly see something happening here: a dialectical mouvement emerges. If we recognize the concept of non-identical as a limit, our series of concepts tends to the non-identical but never reaches it. In other terms, we admit concepts don't allow us to know the thing completely because there is always this undefined non-identical we can't access. Adorno puts the thing and the concept in a dialectical tension, but not any dialectical tension:
1. the antagonistic movement between the concept and the thing never leaves the thing and the sublation (Aufhebung) never takes place;
2. as there is no Aufhebung, the concept and the thing stay for ever different.

Here we have a perfect form of negative dialectic at work.

So, Adorno identifies the relation form between concept and object. We know conceptual thinking is limited and will never reach the non-identical of the object, but we nevertheless have something to work with and continue our investigation: concept and object are in a negatively dialectical relation. Next time, as we will finally talk about Adorno's Constellations, you'll see how important this is.

See GS 8 Negative Dialektik, Zweiter Teil and GS 10, Stichworte. Kritische Modelle 2, Dialektische Epilogemena, Zu Subjekt und Objekt, 1 : "Umgekehrt ist das einzelmenschliche Individuum, sobald uberhaupt auf es in allgemeinbegrifflicher Form als auf das Individuum reflektiert, nicht nur das Dies da irgendeines besonderen Menschen gemeint wird, bereits zu einem Allgemeinen gemacht, ahnlich dem, was im idealistischen Subjektbegriff ausdrucklich wurde; sogar der Ausdruck »besonderer Mensch« bedarf des Gattungsbegriffs, ware sonst sinnleer". Adorno, T. W. (2003). Gesammelte Schriften (R. Tiedemann, Ed.). Suhrkamp. ↩︎
Stone, A., Adorno and Logic, in Cook, D. (Ed.). 2008. Theodor Adorno. Taylor and Francis, p. 55 ↩︎
Stone, A., Adorno and Logic, in Cook, D. (Ed.). 2008. Theodor Adorno. Taylor and Francis, p. 56 ↩︎